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CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CON-
VICTION-CORROBORATION OF COMPLAINANT'S TESTIMONY-The Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals had held that corroboration of a
mature complainant's testimony is no longer required to sustain a
conviction for rape, abrogating its corroboration rule.
Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976) (en
banc).
On May 30, 1973, Eugenia Dickerson was raped by a man she
later identified as James Arnold. Two weeks later, Portia Mills sub-
mitted to a man's demands for sexual intercourse after he threat-
ened and assaulted her. She also identified Arnold as her assailant.
In a joint indictment Arnold was charged with the two rapes.' Before
trial the government requested that the jury not be instructed that
corroboration of the victims' testimony was required for conviction,
in effect asking the trial judge to disregard the District of Colum-
bia's long-standing corroboration rule.' The motion was granted
over the defendant's objection.3 Following a trial in which the gov-
ernment nevertheless introduced corroborative evidence of the com-
plainants' testimony,' the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both
counts. The court imposed sentence and Arnold appealed. 5
1. Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335, 336 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976) (en banc). Rape is
defined at D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (1973). Joinder is permitted if the offenses are of similar
character or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Id. § 23-311(a).
2. See notes 21-33 and accompanying text infra.
3. 358 A.2d at 339. Appellant's pretrial motion to sever the two rape counts was denied
because the similarity of the two offenses supported the joinder. Brief for Appellant at 5,
Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976). Arnold's motion was based upon
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-313 (1973), which affords the court authority to grant relief from a
prejudicial joinder.
4. 358 A.2d at 337-39. Each victim promptly reported the assault to friends as well as to
the police, and each had a physical examination. The testimony of these witnesses paralleled
the complainants' accounts of the circumstances surrounding the rapes.
5. The basis of Arnold's appeal was threefold. He contended that: (1) the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for severance of the offenses; (2) the court erred
in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (3) the court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury that a guilty verdict for rape could not be based upon the complainants'
uncorroborated testimony. 358 A.2d at 336.
The court dispensed with appellant's severance and acquittal arguments. Noting the
striking similarities of the crimes, the court reasoned that the record met the standards for
joinder laid down in Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964), and its progeny.
Drew determined that joinder was proper where evidence for each of the crimes was relevant
to establish a common plan, evidence probably would have been admissible in separate trials
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In argument before the court en banc,l the primary issue was the
validity of the District of Columbia's corroboration requirement.
The court concluded that the trial judge's refusal to give the corro-
boration instruction, mandated by the case law of the jurisdiction,
was error.7 Although adequate corroboration was provided in
Arnold,' the government argued there were compelling reasons to
reconsider and reject the requirement.' The majority agreed and
seized the opportunity to reevaluate the rule. The court affirmed the
defendant's conviction. It rejected the presumption that a rape pro-
secutrix's testimony lacks credibility and abrogated the rule which
required corroboration of her testimony as a condition precedent to
on the issue of identity, and evidence as to each crime was separable and distinct and not
likely to confuse the jury. In moving for acquittal, the appellant had emphasized the absence
of any physical evidence of force and had argued that the circumstantial proof would not
support a rape charge. The court relied on Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776 (1943), which held that evidence of force was not required
and that testimony concerning threats of death or grave harm made to overcome the victim's
resistance was sufficient to submit a rape case to the jury.
6. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (announcing rule that en
banc proceeding would be required to overrule prior decisions).
7. Although it was error for the trial judge to refuse to give the instruction, the error was
harmless under the circumstances. The majority concluded that the record disclosed the
defendant had been fully accorded his constitutional right to a fair trial; the jury was thor-
oughly instructed on the critical issue of credibility and an additional instruction on corrobor-
ation probably would have had little effect on their deliberations. There were adequate
evidence and satisfactory corroboration of the complainants' testimony for the guilty verdict.
The court was convinced that Arnold fell within the "harmless error" standard formulated
by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946) (court must
be able to conclude, with fair assurance, that jury's decision was not swayed by the error).
See 358 A.2d at 341.
8. See note 4 supra. Similar corroborative evidence was held adequate in In re W.E.P.,
318 A.2d 286 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974) (complainant's disheveled appearance, cuts on her hand,
and prompt report to police, accompanied by her ability to accurately describe the room
where the incident occurred, adequate to support her testimony). See also Evans v. United
States, 299 A.2d 136 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973) (prosecutrix's appearance and emotional state
shortly after the incident, along with prompt reporting of offense, provided ample corrobora-
tion).
9. Among the reasons the government proffered for abrogating the rule were: (1) the
jurisdiction's changing interpretations of the requirement had resulted in a labyrinth of
doctrine with doubtful and unpredictable implications; (2) the doctrine of stare decisis was
not meant to perpetuate a precedent no longer deemed just and in keeping with current social
and legal trends; (3) the issue was not more suitable for legislative than judicial determina-
tion because it involved a judicially imposed rule of evidence which courts have the necessary
expertise to handle; and (4) a failure to reach the issue would result in future uncertainty in
the trial courts. Supplemental Memorandum for Appellee at 3-7 (May 22, 1975), Arnold v.
United States, 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental Memo-
randum I for Appelleel.
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conviction. Of the ten judges sitting en banc, five limited their
holding to cases involving "mature" victims and suggested they
would continue to require corroboration where the victim was chron-
ologically or mentally immature.'" Four others expressed concern
over the inherent vagueness in such a limitation and would have
eliminated the need for corroboration in all rape prosecutions." One
judge advocated retaining the rule because, as applied in that juris-
diction, it had not been the source of any demonstrable injustice.
In his view, it had protected innocent persons against biased judg-
ments, which were unavoidable in rape cases. 2
The Arnold court relied heavily on the California Supreme
Court's reasoning in People v. Rincon-Pineda,3 which overruled
precedent in its jurisdiction by disapproving the further use of a
cautionary instruction requiring the jury to carefully scrutinize a
rape prosecutrix's testimony. The cautionary instruction 4 had been
required in the belief that a rape charge was easily made but diffi-
cult to disprove. The California court had catalogued the other pro-
tections afforded the criminal defendant-the presumption of inno-
cence, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right
10. 358 A.2d at 344-45.
11. Id. at 348 (Fickling, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judges Kelly, Kern
and Gallagher joined in the opinion.
12. Id. at 348-52 (Mack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
14. This instruction was traced back to a seventeenth century English author. 1 M. HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 633, 635 (1680), quoted in 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061, at 342-45 (3d
ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
In rejecting the instruction, the California Supreme Court presented a persuasive list of
empirical and theoretical analyses of rape prosecutions. To refute the argument that rape is
a charge easily made, the court cited statistics and studies showing that rape is largely an
underreported crime due to strong social deterrents. E.g., M. AMIR, PA'rrERNS IN FORCIBLE
RAPE 27-28 (1971); FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 15 (1973); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws:
Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919, 921 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sexism in
Society and Law]; Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal not Reform, 81 YALE
L.J. 1365, 1374-75 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Repeal not Reform]. Furthermore, of those
rapes reported, a high percentage are classified "unfounded" by police, and the investigation
is then terminated. See, e.g., AMm, supra at 29; J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL
238 (2d ed. 1969); Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been
Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 281 (1968).
In supporting its conclusion that rape is not more difficult to disprove than other charges,
the court cited FBI statistics and an analysis of jury behavior which demonstrated that juries
frequently acquit a rapist or convict him of a lesser offense even when the evidence of his
guilt is clear. FBI REPORTS, supra at 116; H. KALVEN, JR. &" H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
254 (1966). See generally Repeal not Reform, supra at 1378-84.
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to present witnesses in his defense, and the right to legal coun-
sel-and concluded that these traditional safeguards would suffice
to prevent false convictions for rape as well as for nonsexual
crimes.' Adopting this view, the Arnold court decided that the cor-
roboration requirement no longer served a legitimate purpose since
the accused was adequately protected by the constitutional guaran-
tees of due process.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the appel-
lant's argument that any revision of the corroboration rule should
be made by Congress. The requirement neither existed at common
law nor stemmed from constitutional or statutory provisions."6 Since
this evidentiary rule had been judicially imposed, consideration of
its continued vitality was appropriate for judicial determination. 7
Even if there once had been a rationale for the rule, it contributed
little to the resolution of the credibility issue since any fixed stan-
dard was inadequate for determining a witness' truthfulness.' Fur-
thermore, the suggested purpose of the corroboration rule, avoiding
baseless accusations, could be accomplished by the judicial discre-
tion to set aside or direct a verdict based upon insufficient evi-
dence. 9 The court underscored the importance of determining the
prosecutrix's credibility, but indicated the jury could resolve that
issue when guided by the traditional credibility instruction."0 The
15. The decision undercut the rationale for the presumption that the defendant in a sex-
offense case is entitled to greater protection.than other criminal defendants, and the victim
in such a case must undergo a stricter test of credibility than other witnesses. Accord, State
v. Settle, 111 Ariz. 394, 531 P.2d 151 (1975); State v. Fedderson, 230 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1975)
(similar cautionary instructions disapproved because they constituted a comment upon the
weight of the evidence, an unfair burden upon the victim's testimony, and an infringement
upon the jury's province). See also Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 870 (Wyo. 1976) (Raper, J.,
concurring) (alleged victim of rape should be treated the same as a witness in any other
criminal case).
16. 358 A.2d at 344.
17. But see id. at 349 (Mack, J., dissenting). Judge Mack suggested that the issue was
more complex than the majority realized. In his view, the question was ripe for legislative
review, taking into account several practical realities: the severity of the sentence, the lack
of delineation of degrees of rape, and the risk of attitudinal judgments by jurors who view
rape with suspicion and who often are influenced by racial hostility.
18. Id. at 343.
19. See WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 354. But see Comment, Nebraska's Corroboration
Rule, 54 NEB. L. REv. 93, 104 (1975), where the author suggests that the trial judge's power
to set aside a verdict is severely restricted and considers the corroboration rule a better vehicle
to prevent convictions based on inadequate evidence.
20. 358 A.2d at 344.
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special rule of evidence precluding conviction for rape on the unsup-
ported testimony of a complainant would no longer obtain.
Before Arnold, the corroboration doctrine had long enjoyed ac-
ceptance in the District of Columbia and in other jurisdictions.2
Because of the fear of false accusations and baseless convictions for
sex offenses, 22 a fixed rule had been considered necessary to mini-
mize the possibility of convicting an innocent man. 23 Although the
common law did not require corroboration in prosecutions for rape
or other sexual offenses, 24 early dicta in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals had suggested that corroboration would be helpful
in questionable cases where the complainant's testimony truly
lacked credibility.25 That language evolved 6 into the unqualified
corroboration requirement first articulated in Ewing v. United
States. 2 A prosecutrix's unsupported testimony could no longer sus-
tain a conviction for rape.
During the next thirty years the rule became subject to changing
interpretations as judges in the District of Columbia attempted to
circumvent this troublesome impediment to rape convictions while
adhering to precedent requiring corroboration. 28 The subtle distinc-
tions drawn by the courts indicated uncertainty and vacillation con-
21. See notes 25-30 & 48 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text infra.
24. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 342. At common law, a single witness' testimony was
sufficient to support a jury verdict; credibility did not depend upon the number of supporting
witnesses. Id. § 2034, at 259.
25. Lyles v. United States, 20 App. D.C. 559, 562-63 (1902) (warning of the danger of
basing a conviction on the testimony of a single witness, and emphasizing the importance of
looking to circumstances that would concur with the complainant's statement). See also
Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566, 573 (1912) (acknowledging the common law rule
but underscoring the desirability of showing circumstances which corroborate indirectly the
prosecutrix's testimony).
26. The government's brief in Arnold indicated that over half the District of Columbia
decisions applying the corroboration requirement cited Kidwell directly, the remainder citing
other cases which had relied on Kidwell. Brief for Appellee at 17-18, Arnold v. United States,
358 A.2d 335 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976).
27. 135 F.2d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776 (1943) (corroboration
required in the sense that there must be circumstances which tend to support the prosecu-
trix's story).
28. Compare Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring corrobora-
tion of corpus delicti and identification of accused), and United States v. Bryant, 420 F.2d
1327 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring corroboration of each element of offense and explicit jury
instructions to that effect), with United States v, Terry, 422 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (ques-
tioning Allison and narrowly construing it), and United States v. Gray, 477 F.2d 444 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (indicating that Allison and Bryant were no longer controlling law).
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cerning the propriety of the rule. Decisions closely following Ewing
reaffirmed the necessity for corroboration and imposed stringent
standards for the prosecution to meet.? Eventually, the government
was required not only to introduce independent corroborative evi-
dence to establish every material element of the offense, but also to
substantiate the complainant's identification of her assailant."
More recent decisions, however, reflected a hesitancy to apply the
stricter rule and mitigated prior standards.3' Decisions immediately
preceding Arnold espoused an extremely flexible approach to the
rule, calling only for independent evidence of circumstances which
would convince the trier of fact that the prosecutrix's account of the
alleged offense was not a fabrication. 2 The courts recognized that
every rape case had to be evaluated independently; no checklist of
corroborative factors would provide a satisfactory solution to the
credibility problem. 33 Arnold represents the culmination of this re-
29. See, e.g., Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (conviction of assault
with intent to commit carnal acts reversed when corroboration of prosecutrix's testimony that
defendant attempted to expose himself was lacking); United States v. Bryant, 420 F.2d 1327
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (conviction of assault with intent to commit rape reversed because indepen-
dent evidence including torn dress, bruises, and prompt complaint was considered minimal,
and trial court failed to emphasize corroboration rule in its jury instructions).
30. In Walker v. United States, 223 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1955), Judge Bazelon suggested
that corroboration was required not only to establish the elements of the crime but for the
identification testimony as well. Id. at 620-21 (dissenting opinion); accord, Franklin v. United
States, 330 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (government's evidence showing that the victim was
raped several times deemed insufficient corroboration of her testimony linking the accused
to the crime).
31. The twofold requirement that the prosecution introduce independent evidence sup-
porting both the corpus delicti and the defendant's identity was relaxed in United States v.
Terry, 422 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Terry, the court noted that the need for corroboration
in a rape case was based on the danger of false charges. Any evidence outside the complain-
ant's testimony which could serve to eliminate that danger was sufficient. Id. at 707. The
court in effect resurrected the Ewing rule. See note 27 supra. In United States v. Gray, 477
F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court also adopted a flexible corroboration standard; any
independent evidence which would support a jury conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that
the victim's account of the crime was not a fabrication would suffice to substantiate her story.
The proof required for each case would vary, depending upon the circumstances. For example,
a clear and convincing identification based upon an adequate opportunity to observe the
accused required no further corroboration. Id. at 446.
32. See, e.g., In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 286 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting arguments that
the government was required to produce conclusive medical evidence and corroboration of
complainant's positive identification of her assailants); Evans v. United States, 299 A.2d 136
(D.C. Ct. App. 1973) (specific corroboration of acts described by complaining witnesses not
required).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 477 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (medical testimony
that victim's condition was consistent with penetration, along with her emotional state and
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forming trend. Since the rule had been reinterpreted and revised, it
had lost so much of its force that it had become a source of uncer-
tainty for both prosecutors and defense counsel. 34 Neither could be
sure of the manner in which the rule would be invoked in a given
case or of the supportive evidence which would be deemed sufficient
for conviction. Underlying the Arnold decision was a desire to dispel
the confusion the rule had generated.
While it may be true that the corroboration requirement engen-
dered confusion in the District of Columbia, there are justifications
for its continued existence which the Arnold court largely ignored.
It has been argued that the increased danger of false charges, the
inability of a jury to remain emotionally neutral when dealing with
a rape charge, and the difficulty of disproving an accusation of rape
warrant a special rule of evidence in rape cases. 35 Since rape charges
may be fabrications prompted by questionable motives, it is reason-
able to require that they be supported by independent facts which
substantiate the prosecutrix's account of the incident .3  A belief
persists that in sex cases the defendant's presumption of innocence
will be subverted by the jury's outrage and sympathy for the vic-
tim.37 To ensure that this critical presumption will not be impaired,
an evidentiary adjustment in favor of the defendant may be needed.
A man accused of rape may have difficulty establishing that he did
not have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, or that she con-
sented, since they are frequently alone at the time of the alleged
offense.3 8 If the trial evidence solely consists of two conflicting sto-
ries, the presumption of innocence has not been overcome, and the
accurate description of the scene of events, and the absence of a motive for fabrication
supplied ample corroboration); United States v. Huff, 442 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (bruise
on complainant's head, her emotional state, missing shoe discovered at scene of alleged
offense, and broken lock on door sufficient corroboration despite possible motive for victim
to fabricate the charge).
34. See Supplemental Memorandum I for Appellee, supra note 9, at 4.
35. See, e.g., Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 217, 222-23 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Ploscowe]; Note, Corroborating Charges of
Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1138-39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Corroborating Charges];
Note, The Corroboration Rule and Crimes Accompanying a Rape, 118 U. PA. L. REy. 458
(1970).
36. One commentator has suggested that rape complaints often spring from such motives
as shame, revenge, blackmail and a desire for notoriety. See Ploscowe, supra note 35, at 222-
23.




corroboration requirement should be utilized to resolve the conflict
in the defendant's favor.
These purported bases for the corroboration requirement, for-
merly accepted in the District of Columbia," apparently were re-
jected by the Arnold court. Balancing the conflicting interests in-
volved, abrogation of the rule seems the better view. As both courts 0
and legal commentators" have recognized, neither the theoretical
foundation of the rule nor its justifications is entirely persuasive.
Empirical evidence reveals that juries are more skeptical of rape
accusations than is often supposed.2 Jurors seldom return rape con-
victions in the absence of aggravating circumstances such as the use
of force or violence, and there is evidence that they are lenient with
an accused rapist if there are indications that the victim encouraged
her attacker. 3 The danger of fabrication of rape charges is counter-
balanced by the existence of strong social deterrents to reporting
rapes." The argument that rape offenses are difficult to defend is
also questionable. Instead of being at a disadvantage in disproving
his guilt, a defendant is unlikely to be convicted of rape on the
uncorroborated testimony of a complainant even in those jurisdic-
tions which do not require corroboration. 5 Thus, there seems to be
no reason why the traditional standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt will not provide adequate protection for the accused. He
should not be entitled to special treatment denied other criminal
defendants. Conversely, the rape victim should not be subject to a
39. See Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (risk of unjust
convictions and high frequency of fabricated charges in rape cases cited as reason for corrobor-
ation rule). See also United States v. Bryant, 420 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Franklin
v. United States, 330 F.2d 205, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (expressing similar views).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concur-
ring); People v. Radunovic, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 234 N.E.2d 212, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967) (Breitel,
J., concurring). See also note 14 and accompanying text supra.
41. See, e.g., Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses
in New York, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 275-76 (1971); Sexism in Society and Law, supra note
14, at 931-32; Repeal not Reform, supra note 14, at 1366.
42. See H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-54 (1966).
43. Id. at 249.
44. Statistics show that rape is one of the most underreported crimes. See Sexism in
Society and Law, supra note 14, at 921. Several factors discourage accusations: the stigma
which attaches to the victim of a sordid crime, humiliating publicity, harsh treatment by
police and doctors, and the necessity of facing the insinuations of defense counsel. Id. at 921-
22.
45. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concur-
ring) (thorough critical analysis of the justifications for the corroboration rule presented).
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demeaning presumption against her truthfulness. If she is credible,
her testimony alone should sustain a conviction.
The Arnold decision accords with other jurisdictions which have
recognized that a corroboration requirement rests on invalid prem-
ises. The majority of states, as well as Congress, have judicially or
statutorily rejected the rule 6 for the same reasons that motivated
the Arnold court to eliminate its requirement. The consensus of
legislators is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to
sustain a rape conviction, and corroboration of the victim's testi-
mony is an undesirable and unnecessary burden for the prosecu-
tion. 7 Although some jurisdictions retain a limited version of the
rule, requiring little more than the traditional standard of proof
with the jury's customary consideration of the complainant's credi-
bility, Arnold aligns itself with the majority which has determined
that a rigid corroboration requirement is unwarranted.48
46. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON S. 1, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, at 590 (Comm. Print 1974) (explain-
ing that no corroboration was required to prove rape because the traditional protection af-
forded by the reasonable doubt standard would be adequate to safeguard the accused; a
corroboration requirement would be an artificial substitute for a credibility determination).
See also Comment, Nebraska's Corroboration Rule, 54 NEa. L. REv. 93, 94-95 (1975) (outlin-
ing the differing positions of the states); Repeal not Reform, supra note 14, at 1367-68.
47. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON S. 1, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REvISION AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, at 590 (Comm. Print 1974).
48. The current positions taken by states may be categorized as follows:
(1) Corroboration is required for conviction: GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972) (no convic-
tion for rape on unsupported testimony of the female); Clemmons v. State, 233 Ga. 187, 210
S.E.2d 657 (1974) (elements of the crime must be corroborated by other evidence, but corro-
borating identification evidence is not necessary); State v. Fisher, 190 Neb. 742, 212 N.W.2d
568 (1973) (testimony of prosecutrix alone not sufficient to sustain conviction for rape or
assault with intent to rape).
(2) Corroboration requirement is limited to certain factual circumstances: N.Y. PENAL
LAw §130.16 (McKinney 1975) (corroboration required where victim is deemed incapable of
consenting to the act by reason of age, mental defect, or capacity); State v. Gee, 93 Idaho
636, 470 P.2d 296 (1970) (no corroboration required where character of prosecutrix for truth
and chastity are unimpeached and circumstances surrounding alleged offense support
prosecutrix's statements); People v. Popely, 36 Ill. App. 3d 828, 345 N.E.2d 125 (1976) (testi-
mony of complaining witness, even if contradicted by accused, may be sufficient for convic-
tion if such testimony is "positive"); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147 (Ky. App.
1970) (unsupported testimony of prosecutrix, if not contradictory, incredible, or inherently
improbable, may be sufficient); Villareal v. State, 511 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. 1974) (prosecutrix's
testimony need not be corroborated except where there is neither outcry nor prompt reporting
of act and there existed a reasonable opportunity to do so).
(3) Corroboration is not required: People v. Stevenson, 275 Cal. App. 2d 645, 80 Cal. Rptr.
392 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014 (1970) (victim's testimony that sexual intercourse
occurred does not require corroboration); State v. Riggins, 314 So. 2d 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Duquesne Law Review
While appellate courts are understandably reluctant to overrule
their prior decisions, the Arnold court apparently believed that the
need to amend an unjust precedent outweighed the benefits of sta-
bility and predictability promoted by stare decisis. The court wisely
rejected an emasculated version of the rule which had made a deter-
mination of the proper standard difficult to predict. By limiting its
holding to cases involving "mature" victims,49 however, the major-
ity indicated it still considered rape a unique crime which may
require some precautions to protect the accused." Those courts
which continue to classify the rape victim's testimony as inherently
suspect, thereby carving out exceptions to general evidentiary prin-
ciples, may unintentionally create an effective bar to legitimate
prosecutions. This is particularly troublesome in view of evidence
that reporting and conviction rates for rape are exceptionally low.',
A corroboration requirement, even to the limited extent retained in
Arnold, seems unjustified and alien to our system of criminal justice
which seeks to exonerate the innocent but at the same time prevent
and punish criminal conduct.
Constance A. Hill
1975) (testimony of prosecutrix need not be corroborated); State v. Garcia, 83 N.J. Super.
345, 199 A.2d 860 (1964) (conviction for a sex offense may be sustained on uncorroborated
testimony); In re Johnson, 445 Pa. 270, 284 A.2d 780 (1971) (testimony of one witness can be
sufficient to sustain conviction); Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 212, 191 S.E.2d 200
(1972) (prosecutrix's testimony alone sufficient).
49. See text accompanying notes 10 & 11 supra.
50. Although children or immature persons are generally regarded as less reliable than
adult witnesses, this does not warrant the use of a special testimonial disability for that class
in cases involving sex offenses. Any special cautionary procedures with respect to a child's
testimony should apply to all cases. It is the characteristic of the child, not the crime, that is
significant. See Supplemental Memorandum for Appellee at 4 (Dec. 3, 1975), Arnold v.
United States, 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976).
51. See, e.g., Sexism in Society and Law, supra note 14, at 921, 927-28; Repeal not
Reform, supra note 14, at 1370.
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